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I. INTRODUCTION
While health care cost inflation slowed during the past
few years, it has started to pick up again, 2 and policy makers
have good cause for concern about future increases in health
care spending. Moreover, even if future increases moderate,
policy makers rightly worry about the already high levels of
U.S. spending. The need for effective cost containment
strategies in health care persists, even though the Affordable
Care Act appears to have had some success at containing
health care costs.
Health care spending reforms can focus on physician and
hospital practices or on patient behavior, and popular reform
1 Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director, Hall Center for Law
and Health, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. MD,
JD, Harvard University. I am grateful for the excellent editing of the
Indiana Health Law Ro vie w.
2 Drew Altman, New Evidence Health Spending Is Crowing Faster
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proposals include both approaches. For example, rather than
paying physicians and hospitals in terms of the quantity of
care that they provide and encouraging the provision of too
much care, private insurers and government programs are
turning more and more to forms of reimbursement that are
based on the quality of care delivered. Insurers often adjust
physicians' compensation based on whether they screen their
patients for cancer or high cholesterol, administer
recommended immunizations, or achieve good control of
blood sugar levels for their patients with diabetes. 3 The
Affordable Care Act addresses patient behavior by requiring
insurers to cover important kinds of preventive care for free. 4
That way, people will not be discouraged for financial reasons
from seeking early care that can keep them healthier and
avoid the need for hospitalizations and other expensive
treatments.
In this article, I consider an increasingly common strategy
that insurers use to influence patient behavior-giving
people more "skin in the game." When medical treatment can
be obtained at very low cost, people may be too quick to seek
it when they feel sick, visiting their physicians when they
would do just as well by staying home. Hence, insurers have
raised deductibles 5 and co-payments 6 and shifted the costs of
care to patients in other ways 7 in the hope that people will
3 Aparna Higgins, German Veselovskiy & Lauren McKown, Providor
Performanceo Moasur s in Privato and Public Programs. Achioving
Moaningful Alignmont with Floxibility to Innovato, 32 HEALTH AFF.
1453, 1456-57 (2013).
4 Soo Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et.
seq. (2010)).
5 A deductible refers to the costs of care that the patient pays before
insurance kicks in. If the deductible is $500, the patient pays the first
$500 in health care costs for the year.
6 A co-payment refers to the patient's share of costs when care is
provided. For example, a visit to the doctor's office may come with a co-
pay of $25, with the insurance company picking up the remainder of the
physician's fees for the visit. Co-payments are similar to co-insurance,
under which patients pay a percentage of the costs of care, say twenty
percent of the costs of a hospitalization.
7 Insurers also shift more costs to patients by raising the annual cap
on the patient's share of their health care costs from deductibles, co-
payments, and co-insurance (the cap on total out-of-pocket spending), as
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become more conscious of the costs of their care. Although
concerns about patients seeking too much care are important,
common strategies for giving patients more skin in the game
have been poorly conceived. There is room for skin-in-the-
game strategies to contain high health care spending, but
only when they are properly designed.
II. THE HIGH COSTS OF HEALTH CARE
Health care spending in the United States is approaching
18% of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"), a level well above
other economically -advanced democracies . Countries such
as Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan spend only
about 10 to 11% of GDP on health care. 9 And current U.S.
spending is very high when compared with past U.S.
expenditures. In 1980, health care spending accounted for
only 9% of GDP. 10
To some extent, higher spending makes sense. The
United States is a rich country and therefore can afford to
spend more on health care than many other countries. It is
probably better for a country to spend its plentiful resources
on health care than on yachts or tickets to professional
football games.
But do Americans get enough bang for their extra health
care bucks? Concerns about health care spending are focused
not only on the amount of spending but also on the fact that
the United States does not appear to get sufficient benefit for
all of its extra spending. On many health status metrics, the
United States lags other countries. For example, life
expectancy in the United States trails that of a wide range of
countries, not only including Canada, Germany, Switzerland,
well as by providing less coverage for care received from physicians or
hospitals that are not in the insurance company's network ("out-of-
network" care).
8 OECD, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2013: OECD INDICATORS 157 (OECD
Publishing, 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/
Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf [https ://perma.cc/KAF2-GPE7].
9 1d.
10 Snapshots. Health Care Spending in the United States & Solectod
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and Japan, but also Italy, Spain, Greece, and the United
Kingdom.1 1
Of course, many factors other than health care affect life
expectancy and other measures of health. People in Italy,
Spain, and Greece may live longer because they consume a
Mediterranean diet. 12  Perhaps our higher health care
spending helps narrow the gap between the United States
and other countries even if it does not eliminate the gap.
Indeed, some data suggest that Americans do get value for
their health care dollar. For example, five-year breast cancer
survival rates are higher in the United States than in
Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 13
Similarly, five-year colon cancer survival rates are higher in
the United States than in Canada, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, though lower than in Japan.1 4 And empirical data
indicate that greater spending on cancer care contributes to
the higher survival rates. In a study that considered the
benefits and costs of cancer care in the United States and
Europe, researchers found that the survival gains from the
extra spending on cancer in the United States exceeded the
costs of the care. 15 In another study, researchers found that
reductions in deaths from cancer were greatest in countries
where cancer care spending rose the most between 1995 and
2007.16
But other data indicate that we spend our health care
dollars inefficiently. For example, asthma hospitalization
rates are much higher in the United States than in Canada,
11 OECD, supra note 8, at 25. Infant mortality rates also are better
in many other countries, including Japan, Portugal, Spain, Greece,
France, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 37.
12 Francesco Sofi et al., Accruing Evidence on Benefits ofAdherence
to the Mediterranean Diet on Health:An UpdatedSystematic Review and
Meta -Analysis, 92 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1189 (2010).
13 OECD, supra note 8, at 127.
14 Id. at 129.
15 Tomas Philipson et al., An Analysis of Whether tHigherHealth Care
Spending in the United States Versus Europe Is 'Worth It'in the Case Of
Cancer, 31 HEALTH AFF. 667, 670-71 (2012) (assuming that an extra year
of life has an economic value of $150,000 and comparing the economic
value from the increased life expectancy to the costs of care).
16 Warren Stevens et al., Cancer Mortality Reductions were Greatest
Among Countries Where Cancer Care Spending Rose the Most,
1995-2007, 34 HEALTH AFF. 562 (2015).
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France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and hospitalization
rates for diabetes are much higher than in Canada, Spain,
Italy, and the United Kingdom. 17 If health care did more in
the United States to maintain the health of people with
asthma or diabetes, hospitalization rates would look more
like those in other countries. And a study that estimated the
efficiency of health care systems by comparing health care
spending with health status of a country's residents found
that the United States trailed a wide range of countries, from
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to
Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and China. 18
There also are domestic data suggesting that much health
care spending is wasted. U.S. patients treated in high-cost
communities are no healthier than patients treated in low-
cost communities. 19 Indeed, patients actually might fare
better in lower-spending areas. 20
III. IMPROVING THE RETuRN ON OuR HEALTH CARE DOLLAR
There are many ways to improve the efficiency of health
care spending. If fee-for-service reimbursement encourages
physicians to perform too many surgical procedures, it makes
sense to rely more on salary-based compensation. Or a
percentage of physicians' compensation could be based on the
extent to which they meet quality-related targets for the
health care they provide. For example, physicians would be
paid more if more of their patients receive an annual
influenza vaccine.
A. Increasing Patient 'Skin in the Game"
Should we also try to improve the efficiency of health care
spending by giving patients more "skin in the game?" If
patients had to pay a higher percentage of their health care
17 OECD, supra note 8, at 109.
18 David B. Evans et al., Comparativo Efficioney of National Health
Systems .Cross National Econometric Analysis, 323 BMJ 307, 308-09
(2001).
19 Elliott S. Fisher, Julie P. Bynum & Jonathan S. Skinner, Slowing
the Growth of Hoalth Caro Costs-Lossons from Regional Variation, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850 (2009).
20 Id.
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costs, would people be more likely to refrain from seeking
care when they really do not need a doctor's attention? More
importantly, would people take better care of themselves if
they had to pay more for their medical treatments? Perhaps,
Americans would be healthier, and health costs would be
lower, if people were more sensitive to the costs of the care
that they receive.
By its very nature, health care insurance dulls patient
sensitivity to the costs of care. Assume, for example, that a
particular treatment costs $100 and provides a value to the
patient worth only $75. If the patient were paying the full
cost of care, the treatment would be declined. But if
insurance covers most of the costs of the care, so the patient
would face a co-payment of only $25, the patient would likely
choose the care. Getting $75 of value for $25 is a good deal.2 1
As long as we have health care insurance, patients will
not be fully sensitive to the costs of their health care. But
cost sensitivity is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Even if
we cannot make patients fully sensitive to the costs of their
care, 22 we have to decide on the level of sensitivity. If health
care coverage is too generous, people may seek too much care,
wasting health care resources. If health care coverage is not
generous enough, people may not seek enough care, to the
detriment of their health.
Many employers, insurers, and analysts think that
patients have been insufficiently sensitive to the costs of
their care. 23 Hence, in recent years, we have seen marked
increases in the size of deductibles and co-payments to make
patients more sensitive to health care costs. 24 Indeed, among
employee health care plans, the average deductible for
individual coverage more than doubled between 2006 and
21 Soo David Orentlicher, Cost Containmont and tho Pationt
Protoetion and Afordablo Caro Act, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 67, 71 (2010).
22 Nor would we want them to be. An important reason for having
health care coverage is to ensure that people can have good access to
health care even when they have limited financial resources.
23 Soo, e.g., JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY 8
(6th ed. 2014) ("Fully-insured patients have no incentive to limit their
utilization [of health care].").
24 Higher deductibles and co-payments also offer a way to limit
increases in health care insurance premiums.
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2014, and the percentage of individual plans with deductibles
of $1,000 or more nearly quadrupled. 25 Is this a good trend?
If the goal is simply containing costs, then giving patients
more skin in the game may be useful. Raising the patient's
share of health care costs through deductibles, co-payments
and other out-of-pocket costs reduces patient demand for
care. In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, in which
participants were randomly assigned to health care plans
with different levels of cost-sharing, researchers found that
higher cost-sharing led to fewer physician visits, fewer
prescriptions, and fewer hospitalizations.2 6
But the reductions in financial costs may come with
increases in non-financial costs. In particular, when patients
refrain from seeking care because of the costs of care, their
health may suffer. Several studies indicate that when
patients reduce their demand for care because of costs, they
many not distinguish between needed and unneeded care. In
the RAND study, for example, there was no adverse impact
on health for the average person. 27 However, for poor
individuals with medical problems, those with free care had
better health measures and lower predicted mortality rates
than their counterparts who were discouraged from seeking
care by their deductibles or co-payments. 28
In another study, which involved emergency department
care, researchers again found that increased cost-sharing
had an adverse effect on health for the poor. 29 Higher-income
individuals in high-deductible plans reduced their emergency
department visits only for "low-severity" services-services
that were not urgent and could be provided at a clinic or
doctor's office at a later date.30 But, low-income persons
25 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2014 ANNUAL SURVEY 125-26 (2014),
availablo at http://files.kff.org/attachment/2014-employer-health-
benefits-survey-full-report [https ://perma.cc/HD8U-Y8GS].
26 JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., FREE FOR ALL?:
LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 338 (1993).
27 Id. at 338-39.
28 Id. at 339.
29 J. Frank Wharam et al., Low-Soeiooeonomie-Status Enrolloos in
Hih-Doduetiblo Plans Rodueod High -Sovority Emorgoney Caro, 32
HEALTH AFF. 1398 (2013).
30 Idat 1399.
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reduced visits for both "low-severity" services and the kinds
of "high-severity" services that should be treated urgently in
an emergency department. 31
Or consider a study that analyzed the impact of a new
deductible and co-payments for prescription drugs.32 The
increases in out-of-pocket costs led low-income persons to
reduce their use of both low-value and high-value drugs, and
accompanying the reduction in drug use, there was an
increase in "serious adverse events" (hospitalizations,
nursing home admissions, and deaths).33
While broad increases in patient cost-sharing seem ill-
advised because of their adverse effects on patient health,
might more targeted increases be useful? Recall in this
regard that in the RAND study, greater cost-sharing for the
average person led to a reduction in health care spending
with no harm to health.34 A few possibilities for targeted
cost-sharing come to mind.
1. Higher Cost-Sharing for Lower- Value Care
If the goal of patient skin in the game is to discourage
unnecessary care while preserving desirable care, then it
makes sense to reserve higher cost-sharing for lower-value
care. The Affordable Care Act's requirement of free
preventive care is a good model for this approach.35 We want
people to receive effective preventive care-a high value kind
of care-so the Affordable Care Act prohibits the imposition
of any fees on people when they obtain the care. Similarly,
to encourage the use of generic rather than more expensive
brand-name versions of the same drug, insurers often require
higher co-payments for brand-name drugs. As a general
matter, heath care policy should remove obstacles to desired
behavior while erecting obstacles to undesired behavior.
31 Idat 1403.
32 Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse EvontsAssociatod with Proescription
Drug Cost-Sharing among Elderly and Poor Porsons, 285 JA1A 421, 421
(2001).
33 Id.
34 JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra note 26.
35 Soo Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et.
seq. (2010)).
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2. 'Reference pricing"
The high cost problem is not only a problem of patients
receiving unnecessary care; it also is a problem of patients
receiving necessary care at excessive prices. Hip
replacement surgery might cost $40,000 at one hospital and
$80,000 at another hospital with no difference in quality (or
possibly lower quality at the higher price). Accordingly, some
insurers will reimburse for surgical procedures only at a fixed
"reference" price that reflects the fees charged by low-cost,
high-quality physicians and hospitals.36 If a patient chooses
a more expensive provider of care, the patient is responsible
for the difference between the provider's fees and the
reference price. Data on reference-pricing indicate that it
leads patients to switch to lower-cost providers. 37 It also
causes higher-cost providers to lower their fees.38
3. '"Scaled Cost-Sharing"
The degree to which patients are sensitive to the costs of
their care depends on their income and wealth. 39  A
deductible of $1,000 represents 5% of income for a family
earning $20,000, but only 0.5% of income for a family earning
$200,000. Or when annual caps on out-of-pocket spending
are set at $6,000, they represent 30% of income for a family
earning $20,000 but only 3% of income for a family earning
$200,000. Hence, standard policies for out-of-pocket costs
will likely have a bigger impact on the care-seeking behavior
of lower income persons. And as suggested by the previously-
discussed studies on the health effects of cost-sharing, lower-
income persons may be overly discouraged from seeking care
by standard cost-sharing policies. Accordingly, rather than
36 James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increasos in Consumor
Cost Sharing Rodirect Pationt Volumos and Roduceo Hospital Pricjs for
Orthopodic Surgory, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1392, 1392-93 (2013).
37 Id. at 1394-95.
38 Id.
39 Christopher T. Robertson, S aling Cost--Sharing to Wagos- How
Employor Can Roduce Hoalth ponding and Provido Greator Economic
Security, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. & ETHICS 239, 244 (2014).
Vol. 13:2
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setting cost-sharing levels at fixed dollar amounts, insurers
could calculate deductibles, annual caps, and other forms of
cost-sharing as a percentage of income.4 Deductibles could
be set at 1% of income, and annual caps could be set at 5% of
income.
B. Limits of Cost Containment
While carefully-designed health insurance reforms can
play a significant role in making patients more conscious of
costs, these reforms can play only a limited role in cost
containment. The impact of cost-sharing strategies
dissipates when patients hit their annual cost-sharing
maximums. Once a deductible is satisfied, for example, it no
longer can have any influence, and once annual caps on total
out-of-pocket expenses are exceeded, patients no longer need
to worry about other cost-sharing policies such as
copayments. Reference pricing would still matter even after
annual caps on out-of-pocket spending are satisfied, but
estimates indicate that reference pricing would reduce
overall spending by less than two percent.4 1 In sum, it is
useful to consider health insurance reforms that encourage
greater cost-consciousness among patients, but policy
makers will have to look elsewhere for major savings in
health care spending.
Might other patient-directed policies be useful? This
article has focused so far on insurance plan design, but there
are ways to influence patient behavior. The next section
considers the potential role of employer wellness programs in
containing health care costs.
IV. EMPLOYER WELLNESS PROGRAMS
In addition to lowering health care spending by sending
patients higher bills for their visits to the doctor or the
40 Id.
41 PAUL FRONSTIN & M. CHRISTOPHER ROEBUCK, REFERENCE PRICING
FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES: A NEW TWIST ON THE DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION CONCEPT IN EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS 10
(Employee Benefit Research Institute 2014), available at http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri ib 398-apr14.refprcng.pdf [https://
perma.cc/26PW-Y3UA].
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hospital, we might lower spending by encouraging patients
to take better care of themselves. If people are healthier,
they will not need as many appointments with their doctors
or admissions to the hospital. Employers are increasingly
using the skin-in-the-game approach to promote healthier
behavior. Through financial incentives tied to "wellness
programs," the hope is that employees will eat more
nutritiously, exercise more regularly, and require less health
care.
42
Wellness programs typically are divided into (1) screening
initiatives and (2) intervention activities.43  Screening
initiatives include questionnaires that ask individuals about
their diet, exercise, and other health-related matters. 44
Screening also can include clinical measurements such as a
person's weight, blood sugar, cholesterol, and blood
pressure. 45  If people realize that their weight, blood
pressure, or other measurements are too high, they can
follow up with a physician to see what kinds of action would
be helpful.
Or they might follow up with the wellness program's
intervention activities. These can include counseling about
exercise and diet, smoking cessation programs, gym
memberships, and healthy food offerings in cafeterias or
vending machines. 46
While many employers simply offer their wellness
programs alone, other employers combine the programs with
financial incentives, sometimes rewarding employees for
participation in the programs, at other times rewarding
employees for improvement in their weight, blood pressure,
42 Wellness programs can be implemented outside of the workplace.
Governments, insurers, and individuals for themselves also can design
wellness programs. Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D.
Halpern, The Law, Policy & Ethics of Employers' Uso of Financial
Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 450-51 (2011).
But there are important advantages to employment-based programs, in
large part because people spend much of their waking time at their
workplace. Id. at 455.
43 David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and Efibrts to Encourage





2016 CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE SPENDING: 359
MORE PATIENT "SKIN IN THE GAME?"
or other measures of health.47 Under federal law, there is no
limit on the magnitude of incentives that can be used to
encourage employees to participate in wellness programs.48
While a typical incentive might provide employees with a
rebate on their health insurance premiums of $100 or $200
for checks of weight, blood pressure, blood sugar, and
cholesterol, an employer could offer much higher rebates for
participation-or impose surcharges of any amount for non-
participation. 49
Employers also might want to link their financial rewards
or penalties to results. For example, a rebate or surcharge
on insurance premiums might be tied to the losing of weight,
the reduction of blood pressure, or the achievement of other
health targets. For incentives tied to the satisfaction of
health targets, the incentive may not be any higher than 30%
of the cost of the employee's health insurance coverage (with
a 50% maximum for meeting smoking cessation targets).50
While wellness programs are sound in principle-an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure-there are
significant problems with these programs in practice. For
example, employers often do not choose effective programs.5 1
And even when wellness programs are successful, their
results are modest. In one study, only one-third of employees
lost at least five percent of weight. 52 In another study,
47 Id. at 1648-49.
48 Id. (provisions regarding financial incentives for wellness programs
are included in HIPAA and ACA.).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1649. To protect employees from unfair discrimination,
employers must offer reasonable alternative standards. For example, if
the incentive is tied to weight loss, and a worker has a genetic disease
that makes it very difficult to lose weight, the employer would have to
revise the target for the employee. See id.
51 Karen Chan Osilla et al., Systematic Review of the Impact of
Worksite Wellness Programs, 18 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e68, e78 (2012)
(finding positive outcomes only one half of the time for wellness programs
that were studied with a randomized controlled trial).
52 Caryn Zinn et al., A "Small-Changes" Workplace Weijght Loss and
Maintenance Program. Examination of Weight and Health Outcomes, 54
J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 1230, 1234-35 (2012).
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participants lost less than one percent of weight on average.53
And these modest results may be exaggerated. When
programs are voluntary, "selection bias" may exaggerate
their effectiveness. 54 Hence, randomized controlled studies
of wellness programs find smaller impacts than do non-
randomized studies. In one review of wellness program
studies, researchers found that exercise programs generated
positive results 62% of the time, but only 43% of the time
when the studies involved a randomized control group for
comparison. 55 Unfortunately, experts have not yet figured
out how to design wellness programs that reliably deliver a
high level of effectiveness.
Ineffective programs are not only wasteful, they also can
be harmful. In one of its most important provisions, the ACA
promotes access to health care coverage by eliminating
insurance premium surcharges for people with cancer,
diabetes, heart disease, or other "pre-existing" medical
conditions. 56 No longer does a person's health status affect
the ability to afford health care coverage. But financial
incentives tied to losing weight, lowering blood pressure,
reducing blood sugar, or meeting other health targets will
impose greater costs on persons with health problems,
thereby undermining ACA's protection of persons with pre-
existing medical conditions. Indeed, an analysis of employer
wellness programs suggests that savings on health care
spending from the programs may simply reflect the shifting
of costs to employees with higher risks of illness.57 ACA's
goal of affordable health care is further undermined by the
fact that when person with health problems bear greater
costs, the greater costs fall disproportionately on persons who
are poor.
53 Susan B. Racette et al., Worksito Opportunities for Wollnoss
(WO W)" Effoets on Cardiovascular Dioaso Risk Faetors aftor 1 Yoar, 49
PREVENTIVE MED. 108, 110 tbl. 2 (2009).
54 Selection bias refers to the possibility that a voluntary program will
attract especially motivated participants whose experiences will be
different from the people who choose not to participate in the program.
55 Osilla et al., supra note 51, at e69.
56 Soo 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (2016).
57 Jill R. Horwitz, Brenna D. Kelly & John E. DiNardo, Wollnoss
Ineontivos in tho Workplaeo." Cost Savings through Cost Shifting to
Unhoalthy Workors, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468, 469 (2013).
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While financial incentives tied to wellness programs often
are ineffective and even harmful, there are some wellness
incentives that can be useful. A number of features are
important:
When incentives are tied to short-term progress, they
seem to work better than incentives calculated on an annual
basis. People respond more readily to immediate rewards
and penalties than to delayed rewards and penalties. 58 Thus,
in one study of financial incentives for weight loss,
participants received lottery tickets or accumulated "deposit
contract" rewards on a daily basis if they met their weight
loss goals, 59 and the incentives were effective at encouraging
weight loss during the four months of the study. 60
As this study also suggested, incentives may need to be
maintained indefinitely. Within several months after the
study ended, there was no significant difference in weight
loss between the participants and a control group of people
who had not received the financial incentives. 61 Of course,
this may simply reflect the fact that any strategies for weight
loss need to be continued indefinitely, just as treatments for
high blood pressure, diabetes, and other chronic medical
conditions need to be continued indefinitely.
Finally, program designers need to consider whether their
incentives should be implemented as penalties for failure or
rewards for success. Penalties often are more effective than
rewards at eliciting changes in behavior. People worry more
about losing something they already have than about gaining
something they do not have. 62 On the other hand, people
58 Orentlicher, supra note 43, at 1643, 1652.
59 Kevin G. Volpp et al., Financial Ineontivo -Basod Approaches for
Weight Loss. A Randomized Trial, 300 JAMA 2631, 2632-33 (2008)
(describing a study with deposit contracts where participants committed
a small amount of money each day that was matched at a higher amount
by the study, with the total dollars paid to participants who achieved
their weight loss goals). While deposit contract awards could be earned
on a daily basis, the awards were actually paid out on a monthly basis.
Id. at 2632.
60 Id. at 2634-35.
61 Id. at 2635.
62 Scott D. Halpern et al., Randomizod Trial of Four Financial-
Ineontivo Programs for Smoking Cossation, 372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2108,
2109 (2015).
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prefer to be rewarded for success than penalized for failure,
so reward-based incentives may be a more effective strategy
overall.63
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, concerns about health care cost
containment have led employers, insurers, and governments
to give individuals more skin in their health care game. But
the interest in patient incentives for cost consciousness has
exceeded the benefits that these incentives can deliver.
When used in a limited and properly designed fashion, the
incentives can achieve some cost savings. But the overall
savings will be small, and they can easily be offset by their
own costs if the incentives are not well-designed.
63 Id. at 2114.
Vol. 13:2
